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The Key to Energy Security
Already the world’s second biggest energy consumer, China is presently 
on track to become the world’s largest user of  energy by the year 2030.1  This 
phenomenon has kindled a profusion of  literature to address how China will 
meet this demand and the affect it will have on global energy security. Current 
analyses overwhelmingly focus on the notion that energy security is based 
on the assurance of  reliable energy supply at a reasonable price, invoking 
a disproportionate emphasis on the security of  China’s oil supply. This is 
largely a result of  the psychological elements arising from the uncertainty of  
guaranteed oil supplies for China. In reality, however, oil imports are merely 
one dimension of  China’s energy security concerns and not even the most 
important.  Far less attention has been given to the more obscure though 
imperative factor of  China’s domestic energy institutions and their role in 
meeting the country’s energy security challenges both at home and abroad.2 
Energy institutions are essential because they are the instruments that shape, 
govern and regulate a country’s energy economy. Their structure determines 
the performance of  a nation’s energy industry and its ability to safeguard its 
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energy security. Fundamentally, this ability boils down to whether institutions 
are able to produce and implement a coherent national energy strategy as 
well as foster an industry that can meet a country’s growing energy needs. 
The parameters of  China’s energy institutions do not hold a high degree of  
uncertainty (unlike the supply of  oil from abroad), however, their efficient 
functioning is difficult to accomplish. 
In fact, the evolution of  China’s energy institutions has largely crippled 
their ability to establish and carry out a national energy strategy. Moreover, 
under the nation’s current institutional structure, the energy industry can-
not meet the challenge of  securing the country’s increasingly complex and 
burgeoning domestic energy demand. Hence, restructuring China’s energy 
institutions in a way not previously accomplished is absolutely vital if  China 
is to successfully address its energy security needs.
Confusing Beginnings: China’s Energy Policy-Making System 
Today, all aspects of  China’s energy institutional make-up show a high 
degree of  organizational confusion that is largely a legacy of  its complex 
origins. China’s modern energy industry was modeled in part on the economic 
structure of  the former Soviet Union and in part adapted to China’s unique 
environment. The result was a perplexing array of  both vertical and horizon-
tal institutions. Vertical institutions (tiaotiao) included commissions such as the 
State Planning Commission (SPC) and the 
State Economic and Trade Commission 
(SETC) that integrated energy policies 
with other facets of  the economy. Also in 
this category were line ministries in charge 
of  specific energy industries such as coal, 
power, petroleum and nuclear industries. 
All of  these contained both the central 
and local level government organs. The horizontal institutions (kuaikuai) were 
comprised of  other non-energy ministries such as the Ministry of  Finance 
(MOF) and the Ministry of  Railways (MOR) but still maintained responsibility 
for some segment of  the country’s energy policies at central and local levels. 
Vertical institutions were designed to ensure the government’s central 
control of  these key industries while the horizontal institutions were largely 
Today, all aspects of  China’s 
energy institutional make-
up show a high degree of  
organizational confusion.
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the influence of  the energy governance structure of  the USSR. The latter 
purposely separated energy exploration, production, transportation, refin-
ery, distribution and trade into different segments, creating a hodgepodge 
of  institutions characterized by fragmentation rather than integration.3 The 
energy policies that were crafted under these fragmented energy institutions 
demonstrated a lack of  focus, consistency, and coherence. As the country 
moved away from a planned economy to a market economy both the tiaotaio 
and kuaikuai institutions have gone through a series of  transformations that 
have manifested themselves in two respects: the restructuring of  the country’s 
energy industries and institutional reform. 
Hard Path to Energy Industry Reform
Since its inception in 1949, China’s energy industry has experienced mul-
tiple rounds of  restructuring. These phases were characterized by conflicting 
measures and even frequent reversals, reflecting the government’s vacillation 
between strong central control and greater deregulation of  the country’s 
energy sector.4  
Except for three brief  periods during which a single institution was put 
in charge of  China’s energy strategy, the country has had no central energy 
policy-maker, devolving authority to individual line ministries who took charge 
of  energy policies within their specific industrial sectors.  In the absence of  a 
central decision-making body, the SPC became the default institution oversee-
ing energy policy while regulatory authority was turned over to the SETC, all 
the while line ministries maintained a high degree of  autonomy. Consequently, 
a consistent and long-term energy strategy at the national level was never in 
existence and instead policy was driven by each individual energy sector.
Beginning in the early 1980s, the Chinese government began divesting itself  
from energy production by creating state-owned energy companies and elimi-
nating special line ministries. In the oil sector, the China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and the China Petrochemical Corporation 
(Sinopec) were set up to supervise and conduct offshore development and 
downstream business (i.e., refinery and distribution) respectively. Similarly, 
the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) replaced the Ministry of  
Petroleum Industry (MPI) in 1998, acquiring both its administrative power 
over onshore exploration and production (E&P) as well as inheriting its staff  
and an entrenched organizational culture. 
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As a result, the vertical management system virtually remained intact except 
under the name of  state-owned oil companies (SOEs). Moreover, after these 
companies went public in 2001 and 2002, they had taken on multiple identities 
as state-owned energy companies, publicly listed companies, and as industry 
administrators. These conflicting interests hindered the efficient functioning 
of  China’s oil sector by creating fertile ground for market monopoly which 
the three oil SOEs came to enjoy and empowered them to forestall any reform 
measures working against their interests. Consequently, reforms in the oil sec-
tor have created a market structure where the oil SOEs have sufficient power 
to preserve the status quo in their favor yet they fail in effectively safeguarding 
the country’s energy security. 
Decentralization of  Power and Coal Industries
The restructuring of  China’s power industry resembles that of  the oil 
sector. After the Ministry of  Energy was abolished in 1993, authority over 
China’s power industry was redistributed to the Ministry of  Electric Power 
and various forms of  the State Planning Commission.5  Power industry in-
vestment and development activities finally landed with the newly created 
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State Power Corporation of  China (SPCC) in 1997.6 To enhance efficiency, 
at the end of  2002 the SPCC was split into five power generation companies, 
two grid companies and four services companies.7 As with the oil sector, 
these centrally controlled state-owned power companies also exercise vertical 
control over their regional branches. 
Numerous smaller companies were also established, some of  which passed 
to local governments and some run as independent power producers (IPPs).8 
By the end of  2002, although the SPCC controlled 90 percent of  the coun-
try’s transmission assets, it generated only 46 percent of  the country’s total 
power output.9 In response, the government instituted the State Electricity 
Regulatory Commission (SERC) to regulate the complex hybrid of  decentral-
ized local power companies and IPPs on the one hand and vertically managed 
state-owned companies on the other. 
The power shortages that have taken place over the last three years attest 
to the failure of  the overhaul launched in 2002 and illustrates the impact 
of  a malfunctioning power sector on China’s energy security. Instead of  
promoting competition, the separation of  power generation from transmis-
sion interests in reality concentrated these 
assets in the hands of  state grid companies, 
thereby cementing their monopoly and 
hampering the formation of  a viable power 
market. Moreover, because provincial grid 
companies often base their expansion on 
local economic development and local 
power needs, their proliferation has made it 
impossible for the country to establish a nationwide electricity distribution 
system. Finally, administrative authority remains in the hands of  the NDRC, 
whose approval is necessary for all power development investment. However, 
it does not possess sufficient local knowledge, impeding the timely processing 
of  project applications. Consequently, developments in the country’s power 
sector fall victim to enduring institutional flaws, jeopardizing the country’s 
adequate supply of  electricity.  
Reshuffling of  the coal industry, however, has taken on a different nature. 
Unlike the oil or power sector, the participation of  the private sector, par-
ticularly the township and village coal mines, has been substantial. At their 
peak in 1996, these small coal mines produced 45.6 percent of  the country’s 
The recent power shortages 
illustrate the impact of  a 
malfunctioning power sector 
on China’s energy security.
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total coal.10 By contrast, in the same year, the state mines owned and operated 
by the Ministry of  Coal Industries (MCI) accounted for only 38 percent of  
the country’s production.11 As these small coal mines boost local economies, 
generate employment, and supplement tax revenues, their relationships with 
local governments are often symbiotic. Support and protection are provided 
by local governments in exchange for economic benefits. Consequently, com-
panies in the coal industry far outnumber those in the oil and power sectors, 
while local governments have a far higher degree of  control. This process was 
accelerated in 1998 when the MCI was abolished and all 94 of  the large state-
owned coal mine companies were devolved to various local governments.12 
Hence, the vertical institutions in the coal sector that used to be run by the 
MCI are now entirely gone and in their place has evolved a glut of  local and 
small coal companies, with the total number exceeding 28,000 in 2002.13  
This excess of  small coal mines is also the primary culprit for massive 
death tolls, appalling health safeguards, dangerous pollution levels and poor 
resource utilization in China’s coal industry. In a country where ‘coal is king’, 
such acute decentralization undoubtedly works against the formation of  a 
coherent energy plan. Furthermore, small coal mines, many of  them illegal, 
often operate outside the country’s energy statistical collection system, lead-
ing to wide margins or error on national data figures and complicating the 
country’s energy policy-making.14 
Government’s Turn at Energy Policy Reform
Reforms have not been restricted to the energy industry in China. A diz-
zying succession of  government restructurings has also negatively impacted 
the nation’s energy governance. Since the beginning of  China’s reform period 
alone, no less than five reorganizations have been executed, which have cre-
ated, abolished, and reshuffled the structure, function, and bureaucratic rank 
of  several ministries and up to 100 ministerial-level institutions.15 The latest 
of  these and one of  the most comprehensive to date was the massive institu-
tional reorganization of  2003.
This multiple restructuring has produced two significant fallouts. Most 
importantly is the affect of  numerous and irrational reorganizations on the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the institution 
tasked with crafting and regulating the country’s overall energy development. 
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The NDRC now has the sole authority for strategic planning and regulation 
(e.g. approving major investment projects and setting energy prices) which ef-
fectively makes it both the policymaker and watch dog of  the country’s energy 
industry. 16 Even if  this was a rational set-up, which it is not, it is an impossibly 
large portfolio given the commission’s limited staff  and resources.  
A second consequence of  the bureaucratic consolidation of  2003 is the 
redistribution of  China’s energy policymaking tasks into two commissions 
and eleven ministries. The portfolios of  these thirteen institutions often over-
lap and yet each agency maintains equal bureaucratic rank, creating further 
obstruction in the decision-making process. Given the collapse of  the vertical 
management system in China’s energy institutions, the diffusion of  author-
ity over energy policy among these 13 parallel ministries only worsens the 
fragmentation of  China’s energy policymaking at the national level.  These 
problems illustrate the dysfunctional legacy of  the traditional vertical (tiaotiao) 
institutional framework.
Indeed, the reforms of  China’s energy institutions at both the vertical and 
horizontal levels have had varied effects on how the country’s energy industry 
is governed today. The former vertical energy institutions have almost entirely 
collapsed in the coal industry, remain partially functioning in the power in-
dustry but are largely intact in the oil industry. Horizontal energy institutions, 
on the other hand, are still generally extant albeit under different names and 
configurations. 
From a macro level, this process reveals enormous path dependence. That 
is, the new look of  China’s energy institutions are largely dependent on its past 
structure and function.17  As a result, the initial fragmentation of  the system 
has only been magnified through the reforms over the past decades, with 
the authority over energy planning and policy-making even more incoherent 
than before. Moreover, this fragmentation has worsened at both the national 
and local levels. The example of  state-owned enterprises is telling. At the na-
tional level, they must follow instruction from the State Asset Supervisory & 
Administration Commission (SASAC), the NDRC as well as other ministries. 
At the local level they must answer to three conflicting groups: local branches 
of  the 11 ministries, local branches of  NDRC, and the upper hierarchy of  the 
state-owned enterprise. In an era of  growing dependence on foreign energy, 
the country’s policy-making system is under strain, carrying ominous implica-
tions for meeting the country’s energy security needs. 
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Chart 1   Horizontal energy institutions in China (kuai kuai)
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Impairing Energy Security Strategy
The way energy institutions are structured and operate in China predisposes 
the country toward a series of  loosely connected policies that are inconsistent, 
short-sighted and ad hoc, precluding them from producing any coherent and 
long-term national energy strategy. 
First, current energy institutions prevent China from effectively planning 
its energy future. By replacing energy specific line ministries with state-owned 
energy companies or transferring their activities to local governments, the 
central government has essentially given up its control over individual energy 
sectors. Also, by partitioning authority over 
energy policy into thirteen parallel ministerial 
organizations, the government has created a 
system in which no single bureaucracy has a 
political upper hand over others. The result 
is a system with ‘too many cooks in the 
kitchen’, leading to severe fragmentation of  
China’s energy policymaking process. The 
resulting fragmentation of  decision-making at both vertical and horizontal 
levels creates the ‘rules of  the game’ in China’s political system requiring 
negotiation and bargaining that is often protracted and inconclusive.19  A case 
in point is the debate in China about whether to impose a fuel tax. The issue 
was raised in 1999 and debated numerous times, but no consensus has been 
reached between the Ministry of  Finance, the Ministry of  Transportation, the 
Ministry of  Agriculture and the State Administration of  Taxation (SAOT). 
Although the imposition of  a fuel tax would greatly help to correct the skewed 
pricing structure and encourage demand-side conservation of  oil in China, a 
goal that is line with China’s energy security, the awkward balance of  winners 
and losers among the horizontal institutions involved has so far prevented any 
policy from materializing. 20
With competing institutional interests unable to reach compromise, many 
of  the thorny decisions are foisted on the country’s leadership to solve, who 
invariably become overloaded. The limited capacity for intervention from the 
country’s top leaders results in a state of  inertia with the status quo char-
acterizing the reform process in China’s energy industry. Thus, rather than 
being proactive, the top leadership is forced to be reactive to challenges to the 
country’s energy security.
The process of  institutional 
reform and reorganization 
has revealed enormous path 
dependence.
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The various institutional reforms have also led to a progressive weakening 
of  the central government’s ability to formulate national energy strategies.21 
Frequent restructurings have drained the central government of  talent with 
human resources increasingly going to state-owned companies, representative 
offices in Beijing, and foreign enterprises. Consequently, the level of  compe-
tency within the central government has declined while those organizations to 
which good talent has gone have enhanced their lobbying power at the central 
level. 
The present state of  the NDRC’s Energy Bureau is a salient example of  
the central government’s critical deficiency as an effective policymaker. The 
Energy Bureau is only one of  over 20 sub-departments under the NDRC, and 
is staffed by 30 people. Similarly, the National Statistical Bureau, charged with 
handling energy data of  the world’s second largest consumer of  energy, has 
a three-person staff.22 By contrast, the United States, the world’s top energy 
guzzler, has a 14,000-strong Department of  Energy, of  which approximately 
2,000 staff  map out policy and 600 collect and analyze data. The 30 people 
within China’s Energy Bureau are overwhelmed by the deluge of  daily project 
reviews and approvals, and have little time for drafting the country’s energy 
policy or strategy. 
China’s past bureaucratic reshuffling has also created an interchange of  
personnel between government and industry that deeply conflicts with a 
pursuit of  true reform such as the ability of  an individual to move from a 
state-owned energy company to a regulatory body. For example, Chen Jinhua, 
former CEO of  Sinopec became the director of  the SPC between 1993 and 
1998. Similarly, after the 1998 government restructuring, Sheng Huaren, CEO 
of  Sinopec, became director of  the SETC between 1998 and 2001. And vice 
versa, transfer from the line ministry to a state-owned energy company is an-
other form of  institutional exchange. Wang Tao, following his post as head of  
the petroleum ministry (between 1985 and 1988), became the CEO of  CNPC. 
Finally, transfers have also occurred from the energy industry to one of  the 
11 horizontal ministries. The interchange of  personnel has forged linkages 
between the government and the state-owned energy companies, ensuring the 
latter’s influence on the former and thus forestalling any policy reform that is 
not in the interest of  the ministries or national energy companies. At the same 
time, as inheritors of  these linkages, the state-owned energy companies have 
used them to thwart reforms that curb their monopoly status. Consequently, 
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both government and industry are captured by these linkages and only sup-
port policies and reforms in their own interest. Decision-making is therefore 
ad hoc, reactive and supports the status quo. 23
Cyclical Traps
Institutional failings also contribute to the country’s cyclical energy insecu-
rity in the form of  power shortages. 24 Overinvestment by local governments, 
which have led to unsustainable growth and an unexpected demand for en-
ergy, has been blamed for the recent power shortages. This rationale is flawed, 
however, as China has sufficient coal to generate power to fuel the economy. 
Power shortages in some parts of  China, such as the Pear River Delta area 
which is located far from the coal mines, can be explained in part as the 
result of  transportation bottlenecks. However, recent power shortages swept 
more than two-thirds of  China’s provinces and localities, wreaking enormous 
havoc on the country’s economy.25 Power shortages of  that magnitude indi-
cate larger systemic problems that cannot be explained by local government 
overinvestment.  
In reality, two institutional factors in the electricity sector contributed to 
China’s recent cyclical energy insecurity. Foremost, the SDPC made a colossal 
blunder when drafting the country’s electricity development plan following 
the Asian Financial Crisis. Based on then-current growth rates, the SDPC 
issued a policy of  disallowing any coal-fired power plants for three years. 
As a result, investment in the power sector precipitously declined, leading to 
huge decreases in power capacity. 26  With rapidly rising demand for electricity 
far surpassing investment, power shortages emerged in 2002 and worsened 
thereafter. 
Friction between coal prices and electricity tariffs exacerbated the power 
shortages. Two coal markets operate in parallel with each other in China: the 
first brings together large state-owned coal mines and coal consumers under 
long-term contracts; the other coal market is local, with coal mines producing 
an average of  only a few hundred tons of  coal per annum for small industrial, 
residential, and commercial consumers.27 The large coal market accounts for 
60 percent of  the country’s total coal production and is subject to government 
price controls while the small coal market, accounting for 40 percent of  the 
country’s total coal production, sells at market prices.28 The price differential 
between the two can be as large as 100 RMB per ton (about $12.5 per ton).29 
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Power shortages have driven up coal prices on the market, with demands by 
state-owned coal producers to fairly benefit from the shift in prices. However, 
as power producers are also restricted by electricity price fixing, they refused 
to pay higher cost for coal.  This struggle between power producers and coal 
producers has aggravated the power shortages.
Market Disincentives
A number of  pricing distortions and import quota systems also work 
against China’s oil security. The price structure of  the Chinese oil market cre-
ates perverse incentives and has contributed to the recent artificial shortages 
of  gasoline and diesel in Southern China.30  The suppression of  domestic 
fuel prices leads to inefficiency and even encourages consumption at a time 
when the country is increasingly dependent on foreign oil.  In addition, by 
keeping the retail prices low, the country’s downstream sector is put under 
strain because they must buy crude from the international oil market. This 
is true for Sinopec, which is the country’s largest refinery. Crude supply 
from domestic oil fields controlled by Sinopec only accounts for half  of  the 
company’s refinery needs. As a result, Sinopec has to pay the international 
price for its imported crude but sell its refined products at a domestic price – a 
money losing situation.31 Therefore, when international prices are high (often 
the result of  rising demand by China it-
self) there are disincentives for refineries 
to sell their products domestically. With 
cruel irony, China’s exports of  diesel and 
gasoline actually went up at the same time 
that fuel shortages were hitting China’s 
south and east in 2004.  Moreover, 1,200 tons of  oil products were reportedly 
smuggled out of  China every day during the period of  peak fuel shortages in 
Guangdong Province.
The monopoly enjoyed by the three state-owned oil companies – CNPC, 
Sinopec, and CNOOC – also often work against China’s oil security. The mo-
nopoly makes it difficult for private oil companies in China to bring more oil 
supply to the market. Specifically, exploration rights are monopolized by the 
three big oil companies, thus private oil companies in China either concentrate 
on the downstream sector or invest in the upstream projects abroad. With 
little access to upstream supply, private companies must pay high prices for 
The price structure of  the 
Chinese oil market creates 
perverse incentives.
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crude and sell their refined products at low domestic prices. Unlike Sinopec, 
however, they do not receive government subsidies. Consequently, high in-
ternational prices swiftly put them at risk of  bankruptcy, making the entire 
private sector and the competitive environment extremely fragile. 
A number of  dangers result from the irrational quota system as well. The 
primary problem is that the majority of  the import quota is controlled by 
the big three oil companies, Sinochem and their joint ventures. If  private or 
smaller companies obtain import quotas or produce oil overseas, they must sell 
crude to refineries owned by these major enterprises, essentially discouraging 
the private oil companies from investing abroad and bringing more oil back 
to China.  This regulatory framework even extends to the larger enterprises. 
For example, before 2004, CNOOC could only import 4 million tons of  
crude oil because of  their import quota allocation, creating the paradoxical 
situation where CNOOC was forced to sell the majority of  equity oil to the 
international oil market instead of  the Chinese market where demand was 
rising at unprecedented rates.32 
Institutions Born Again?
A series of  developments over the last couple of  years have seriously shaken 
the country’s energy economy and have begun to elicit systemic change. This 
stems, in large part, from increasingly more energy crises than the country has 
previously witnessed. The power shortages that swept more than two-thirds 
of  China’s provinces and municipalities since 2002 have forced millions of  
households to suffer blackouts and brownouts and have brought hundreds 
of  factories to a standstill, causing estimated economic losses of  up to 1 
trillion RMB ($125 billion) between 2000 and 2005. 33  These power shortages 
triggered a widespread energy squeeze across the country and led to the hord-
ing of  coal by many local governments and enterprises. The overwhelming 
demand for coal created bottlenecks in the country’s railway system, which in 
turn exacerbated existing shortages. Without access to adequate coal supply, 
many regions, particularly the Pearl River Delta area, resorted to oil and gas to 
generate power. These acute shortages caused ripples to other areas of  energy 
demand including petroleum products (such as diesel) to produce electricity, 
competing with demand at the pump. All of  this has led to sharp growth of  
energy imports, with annual crude imports registered at 15, 31 and 35 percent 
for 2002, 2003, and 2004 respectively. 34
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Chart 2   Structure of  China’s energy institutions after 2005
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This sharp growth in energy demand has not only pushed up the country’s 
growing dependence on foreign oil but has also been a main culprit in the 
recent hike in the world oil prices, all of  which challenges China’s ability to 
withstand possible supply disruptions and price shocks. The U.S. campaign 
against Iraq in late 2002 and its expected effect on world oil prices and global 
oil supply heightened the sense of  urgency over energy security within China’s 
leadership. 35  Taken together, the above developments seemingly place China 
on the edge of, if  not already in the middle of, an energy crisis. 36 
Yet, this atmosphere of  crisis may be a blessing in disguise. It serves to 
highlight the country’s vulnerabilities to domestic and international energy 
supply systems and thereby awaken the Chinese leadership to the enormity 
of  the challenges facing the country. Consequently, energy security is now 
firmly at the top of  the leadership’s domestic and foreign policy agenda and 
has prompted the government to tackle some of  the issues related to the 
institutional arrangements of  the country’s energy industry. 
Importantly, the government has had another go at strengthening the 
policy-making functions of  China’s energy institutions. In May of  2005, the 
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State Council issued Document No. 14 that established a State Energy Leading 
Small Group (LSG), which is headed by Premier Wen Jiabao with the assis-
tance of  two Vice Premiers – Huang Ju and Zeng Peiyan – and is comprised 
of  13 top leaders from the country’s major ministries and administrations. 
This is the first time since 1993, when the Ministry of  Energy was dissolved, 
that a central body has been inaugurated to be in charge of  China’s overall 
energy policy. The State Energy LSG, however, does not meet on a routine 
basis. To support its routine work, the central government subsequently set 
up a 24-member State Energy Office, headed by Ma Kai, head of  NDRC, and 
aided by Ma Fucai, former general manager of  CNPC.37  
In addition to restructuring the country’s energy policymaking system, 
the central government also shored up the regulatory power of  the State 
Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC). Although the SERC was created 
to regulate the power sector, the authority over electricity price-setting resides 
with the NDRC. Under this system, SERC has been very weak. With the 
power shortages of  2004, China’s leadership is convinced the NDRC alone is 
not able to deal with China’s cyclical energy crises. As a result, the government 
has recently clarified the functions between the SERC and NDRC, with the 
former responsible for regulating and issuing permits to conduct business op-
erations in the power sector and the latter governing review and approval of  
power projects. The NDRC must also consult with the SERC before adjusting 
electricity prices nationwide.
Breaking the Back of  Monopolies
There has also been a concentrated effort to dilute the monopolies enjoyed 
by China’s major oil companies, with the aim of  boosting their domestic and 
international competitiveness and their ability to secure the country’s oil secu-
rity. To accomplish this, the central government has blurred the lines of  busi-
ness and operation. For example, offshore E&P was previously dominated by 
CNOOC, but in 2004 CNPC and Sinopec received authorization to operate 
in the South China Sea and East China Sea. In a similar fashion, CNOOC has 
made forays into onshore development, which was once the sole purview of  
CNPC and Sinopec.38 With similar motivations, the government has also en-
couraged all state-owned oil companies to become fully integrated companies 
– similar to major international energy companies. The downstream sector 
was traditionally dominated by Sinopec and CNPC, but CNOOC has made 
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inroads here as well by starting the construction of  a refinery in Huizhou, 
Guangdong Province. Exclusive international oil trading rights held by CNPC, 
Sinopec and Sinochem ended in May of  2004 when CNOOC won authoriza-
tion to import oil. This ended the irony that CNOOC had to sell its equity oil 
on the international market. Similarly, both 
CNPC and Sinopec are starting to make 
forays into the LNG business, which was 
formerly dominated by CNOOC while 
Sinochem received authority to invest in 
overseas upstream acquisitions in 2001.
China also began seriously opening 
its domestic oil market both to honor 
its WTO obligations and to increase the 
number of  competing players to secure oil 
for the country. To these ends, deregulations took place in three areas. First, 
the central government increasingly relaxed restrictions on non-state owned 
oil companies, granting them import quotas for oil and oil products for the 
first time in 2002. Since then, they have imported 8.28 million tons of  oil and 
4.6 million tons of  oil products raising their share of  these imports by 15 
percent.
The central government has also opened the retail market of  petroleum 
products to foreign oil companies, paving the way for some of  the largest 
foreign investments in China’s domestic energy industry. Many international 
concerns have responded to this new policy with plans to open thousands 
of  gas stations jointly with China’s oil majors. Statistics show that BP, Exxon 
Mobil, Shell and Total SA have all been approved to set up 3,600 gas stations 
altogether in cooperation with Sinopec and CNPC in northern China as well 
as in the Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong provinces. 39
The upstream oil and gas sector is gradually being exposed to private in-
vestment as well. On Feb. 24, 2005, the central government issued the report, 
“Opinions of  the State Council on Encouraging, Supporting and Guiding the 
Development of  Private and Other Non-Public Economic Sectors.” 40  This is 
the first policy document to promote the development of  private enterprises 
in this sector since 1949 and it marks the important step toward rectifying the 
irrational circumstance in China where domestic capital is disallowed from 
investing in certain areas where foreign capital is allowed. More importantly, 
The energy crises of  the 
past several years may be a 
blessing in disguise as it serves 
to highlight the country’s 
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it granted private capital the right to conduct oil E&P and mining. To echo 
this new round of  deregulation in the energy sector, the Great Wall United 
Petroleum Company (GUPC), China’s first independent oil group that repre-
sents more than 30 domestic privately-owned oil firms, was formed on June 
29, 2005. 
Finally, the energy shortages have led to progress in risk management. The 
central government has both promulgated detailed contingency plans and 
established a State Contingency LSG under SERC to deal with potential mas-
sive blackouts. 42/43   Similarly, perceived threats to oil supply and price stability 
have also quickened the government’s pace to create mechanisms to reduce 
risks to the country’s oil security by approving and initiating construction of  
four SPR cites in Zhenhan, Zhoushan, Dalian and Huangdao. Furthermore, 
a fuel oil future exchange was set up in the fall of  2004 to better manage the 
negative impacts of  price fluctuations. 
Whither China’s Energy Institutions
The latest efforts by the central government to restructure both the energy 
policy making system and the energy markets should be lauded as construc-
tive change, but neither move has fundamentally tackled the real hurdles 
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to greater energy security. Of  the highest priority is the enduring lack of  
decisive leadership with the energy institution in China. Although headed 
by two premiers and including top leaders from 13 ministerial agencies, the 
State Energy Leading Small Group (LSG) is not a true policymaking body. 
Instead, its primary tasks are to research a national blueprint for an energy 
strategy including energy development, conservation, emergency systems as 
well as international cooperation within the energy sector. It also provides 
consultation to the State Council for policy formation.44  Clearly, under this 
mandate, the LSG and its acting agency, the State Energy Office, is more 
of  a high-level research group and advisory council than a driving force in 
energy policymaking. With the absence of  such a body, the existing problems 
of  fragmentation and compartmentalization will continue to plague China’s 
energy institutions.
One radical solution to this paramount issue would be to reestablish a 
powerful Ministry of  Energy. However, several major factors would invari-
able work against this option. At a minimum, 
the redistribution of  power and resources 
that would result in establishing a new energy 
ministry would incur formidable resistance by 
the 13 parallel ministerial organizations and 
the mighty state-owned energy companies. 
This reality alone effectively makes establish-
ing such an institution a non-starter. Even if  
it did go through, chances are that some form 
of  accommodation would likely be neces-
sary with these two bureaucracies as well as local governments, making the 
ministry a mere symbolic head at best or, at worst, further fragmenting the 
policymaking architecture. Conversely, if  concentrating the authority over 
coal, oil, gas, and power into one administrative body was successful, the 
energy ministry could become a super-institution with unprecedented power. 
Given the incomplete deregulation of  the energy sector, such a body may 
only increase heavy-handed administrative intervention, thus further hinder-
ing the country’s energy security. Hence, before these issues are sorted out, 
reestablishing the Ministry of  Energy in the current environment will remain 
a distant and perhaps inadvisable option. 
Alternatively, incremental change to the existing institutional arrangements 
is feasible. The government should clearly delineate energy policy making, 
Without a powerful policy-
making body, the existing 
problems of  fragmentation 
and compartmentalization 
will continue to plague 
China’s energy institutions.
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implementation, and industry regulatory functions. Since reestablishing an 
energy ministry in the short term is very unlikely, the government should 
transform the State Energy LSG into a full-fledged national policymaker 
rather than a consulting body. This may be feasible if  Premier Wen Jiabao 
instills it with sufficient political leadership and helps facilitate coordination 
between the 13 relevant parallel ministries and their energy portfolios. The 
success of  the State Energy LSG requires formalizing its agenda and insti-
tuting frequent meetings on a minimum quarterly basis to decide on long 
term national development goals and energy security. Implementation can be 
carried out by existing institutions with the State Energy Office responsible 
for fulfilling long-term energy strategies, and the Energy Bureau responsible 
for overseeing short-term energy policies.
While policymaking authority should remain concentrated at the central 
level, regulation can be delegated. In addition to SERC, the country needs 
regulatory commissions for all other sectors of  the energy industry, including 
oil, natural gas, coal, nuclear power and renewable energy sectors. The Energy 
Bureau can reduce its administrative burden and let these regulatory commis-
sions supervise the country’s energy market and deepen the country’s energy 
market liberalization. This will not only allow the Energy Bureau to focus on 
project review and project approval but also prevent the energy market regu-
latory bodies from being captured by the country’s powerful energy industry. 
However, further restructuring is necessary before these independent 
regulatory commissions can function effectively. Foremost in this regard, the 
central government must reclaim the regulatory power that was previously 
transferred to the powerful state energy companies and local governments. 
This problem is clearly demonstrated by the regulatory capture CNPC and 
CNOOC have over cooperation with foreign oil companies for onshore and 
offshore E&P. In an attempt to protect their own turf, these companies are 
often reluctant to open exploration plots to foreign interests and as a result 
obstruct not only badly needed foreign investment but also slow domestic 
energy production. Other facets of  this irrational, anti-competitive system are 
currently manifested. CNPC and Sinopec recently obtained some offshore 
acreage for E&P. However, offshore development requires a partnership 
with a foreign oil company.  Based on China’s regulations, CNOOC remains 
the sole official partner for foreign companies to develop China’s offshore 
resources. 45  Consequently, neither CNPC nor Sinopec has made significant 




In 2003, a bitter struggle ensued over the building of  a series of  dams 
in the middle and lower reaches of  the Nu River in Yunan Province. The 
State Environment Protection Agency (SEPA), the designated central in-
stitution tasked with protecting China’s environment vigorously opposed 
the project based on broad environmental concerns against powerful 
private power generation interests backed by local governments. This 
case brought to light a number of  debilitating institutional problems with 
regard to safeguarding China’s environment.
At the central level, SEPA is forced to cooperate with other ministries 
on environmental issues. As a result, the agency often cannot decree a stop 
to projects that fall short of  its environmental standards and are approved 
by other ministries. To further complicate this conflicting institutional 
climate, SEPA’s national authority is undermined by its limited authority 
over offices at the local levels. Local bureaus answer only nominally to 
national SEPA because they are required to report to a separate vertical 
system under the control of  local governments. This is largely because 
local governments decide both the personnel and budget of  the local 
bureaus of  the SEPA. Not surprisingly, as the latter is beholden to the 
local governments for their wages, facilities, career growth and benefits, 
they are rather powerless. A natural dilemma arises for all local SEPA 
bureaus when projects with environmental protection issues compete 
with local employment and economic growth.
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Whether China reforms the regulatory or policymaking institutions, the 
Chinese government must expand the personnel and resource capacity of  
China’s energy governance. Currently, at the national level, less than 170 
people are working to solve the enormous energy challenges for a population 
of  1.3 billion people.46 Undoubtedly, this is a recipe that all but guarantees 
failure. An immediate and substantial increase in the number of  staff  mem-
bers working on the country’s energy policy, particularly the staff  level at the 
Energy Bureau, is long overdue.
The central government should also take steps to reduce administrative 
controls, market monopoly, price distortions, and import quota in order to 
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foster an institutional environment conducive to the country’s energy security. 
Although private investment has been welcomed in the domestic oil and gas 
sectors since early 2005, administrative controls by state-owned oil companies 
have so far blocked any significant private participation. A case in point is the 
failure of  the Great Wall United Petroleum 
Company, China’s first private oil group, to 
acquire a permit to engage in exploration, 
wholesale, retail, and import of  crude/oil 
products. Consequently, GUPC has become 
merely a figurehead. By contrast, state-
owned energy companies enjoy exclusive oil 
and gas exploration rights, controlling 99.6 
percent of  the country’s total exploration acreage. Unfortunately, stewardship 
over these precious resources by state companies is critically flawed. In a 2003 
annual review of  the 875 exploration projects controlled by state companies, 
45 percent did not receive the required minimum investment and 36 percent 
received no investment at all. 47 Therefore, the government should strictly 
stipulate that all energy development projects that do not receive minimum 
investment be subject to auction on the market and permits awarded to private 
oil companies that have enough capital and technology.
Private domestic oil companies should also be actively encouraged to join 
the ‘go out’ campaign by investing overseas. This will simultaneously boost 
the country’s oil supply and help to redress accusations targeted at China’s 
state-owned oil companies for their controversial investment strategies. To ac-
complish this, the government will need to gradually eliminate import quotas 
and regulation barriers to private interests.
Finally, the government should further strengthen the country’s energy risk 
management mechanism. The development of  the strategic petroleum reserve 
is an urgent goal and one to which private oil companies can contribute. An 
expansion of  the country’s futures market from its present narrow coverage 
of  fuel oils to a broader platform including crude oil would help China man-
age risk to price instability. Additionally, in the long term the government can 
look to closer collaboration with the International Energy Agency to tap into 
its risk management mechanisms.
Energy institutions manage and regulate the complex components of  the 
country’s energy industry. Unfortunately, the configuration of  that body has 
largely constrained the country’s ability to meet the challenges of  cyclical power 
The Chinese government 
must expand the personnel 
and resource capacity of  
China’s energy governance.
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shortages, oil insecurity, and environmental degradation.  The size and path 
dependent nature of  the energy bureaucracy makes any revolutionary reform 
to China’s institutional culture difficult, and perhaps, impossible. Incremental 
change is possibly the only hope for China’s system. Alternatively, energy 
crises may be the only viable stimulus to push reform of  China’s energy 
institutions through to completion. While restructuring of  these institutions 
may be doubtful, it will be absolutely vital to the nation’s energy security. Thus 
far, China has muddled through and may be lucky enough to avert an energy 
crisis without deep institutional reform.  But that would be betting on an 
unacceptably uncertain future.
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